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 Bangladesh is in limbo. If one believes the 
observers and recognizes international 
statements, the country currently finds itself 
in between a post and a pre-election 
scenario. However, one thing is for sure, the 
deep political crisis that emerged in past 
months will continue in 2014. The enforced 
general elections on 5 January did not bring 
about a solution or any improvement at all. 
Instead of free and fair polls and a smooth 
transfer of power, which was hoped to calm 
down the situation, the country and its 
people have been confronted with a flawed 
electoral process, political standoff, and 
endemic violence. The fact that the late 
acting ‚interim government’ under the 
leadership of Sheikh Hasina, head of the 
ruling Awami League (AL), resisted or 
ignored all calls from the rival Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP) and other 
oppositional forces to step done to path the 
way for the establishment of a ‚neutral 
caretaker government’. This was 
aggravating the already much tensed 
volatile political situation. The claim of re-
establishing the institution of a ‘neutral 
caretaker government’ to carry out elections 
emerged already in mid-2011, when the very 
same body was abandoned by the AL 
government through the passing of the 15th 
constitutional amendment. This act was 
interpreted by the opposition as an 
unfortunate and unnecessary step, and as a 
further erosion of the weak institutional 
framework for political gains. Furthermore, 
any move of the AL government in 
organising elections outside the known 
framework of the caretaker government was 
seen as a way of truncating the electoral 
process. In consequence the abolition of the 
caretaker government, the formation of an 
alternative interim government by the ruling 
party, and the subsequent conduct of polls 
provoked the opposition and aroused 
protests.  
 
To understand the significance of a neutral 
caretaker government one not only has to 
take the concrete concept into account but 
also its role in Bangladesh’s political 
development. The concept of holding 
general elections under a caretaker 
government was a peculiarity of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh. According to 
this constitution, the term ‘caretaker 
government’ refers to a neutral, non-partisan 
and non-party interim government that is 
responsible for ensuring free, fair and 
impartial general elections after a 
parliament’s term has come to an end. In 
order to provide the caretaker government 
with the necessary legitimacy, the 13th 
amendment to the constitution was passed 
on 26 March 1996. According to this 
provision, such a government must take 
office within 15 days of the dissolution of 
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 parliament and it must organize general 
elections within 90 days of the dissolution as 
well as giving the Bangladesh Election 
Commission (BEC) all the support 
necessary for holding free and fair 
parliamentary elections. A caretaker 
government consists of a Chief Adviser and 
not more than 10 other advisers, all 
appointed by the incumbent President to 
whom it is also collectively responsible. The 
Chief Adviser was supposed to be the most 
recently retired Chief Justice, and assumes 
the functions of the Prime Minister. The 
temporary government exercises executive 
powers until a new Prime Minister has been 
appointed and his regular cabinet is formed. 
However, it is not designed to be fully 
empowered interim government. Besides 
organizing a democratic transfer of power it 
is not allowed to make any policy decisions 
that lie beyond the electoral remit or which 
may influence the electoral results. It is 
restricted to run the necessary day-to-day 
administration and ordinary routine 
procedures of governance. Under this 
abrogated constitutional framework two 
caretaker governments have been installed 
so far in 1996 as well as in 2001 and 
subsequent general elections were carried 
out. 
 
However, in 2006 the political reality turned 
out to be different. Here, one has to 
recognize that since the introduction of the 
constitutional amendment that provided for 
the institution of a caretaker government, 
political parties have recurrently been in 
conflict with each other over the formation of 
these forms of interim administrations. In 
2006 this led to an extremely violent 
confrontation between supporters of the AL 
and BNP which paralysed the political 
system. In consequence, under the 
directives of the military, the first caretaker 
government in 2006 of Iajuddin Ahmed, 
which faced harsh political resistance, was 
forced to resign, the scheduled elections 
were postponed indefinitely, and a second 
caretaker government under Chief Adviser 
Fakhruddin Ahmed was installed. The 
establishment of Ahmed’s caretaker 
government, which was facilitated and 
orchestrated by the Bangladesh armed 
forces, stayed in power for the following two 
years. Even though there was no direct 
military takeover, between 11 January 2006 
and 6 January 2009, with the help of the 
armed forces Bangladesh was governed by 
an unconstitutional and undemocratic 
government. There is no question that the 
negative experiences of many members and 
sympathisers of the AL served as a 
justification to get rid of the institution of the 
caretaker government. However, the 
abolished institution proofed in the past that 
it can work -when there is political will 
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 among the leadership of the two rival 
camps- and produce functioning 
governments on the basis of more or less 
free and fair elections (1996 and 2001). 
 
Therefore it does not come as a surprise 
that the latest round of elections did not end 
the traditional political stalemate between 
the major political forces. In fact, the 
situation turned from bad to worse and the 
country experienced its most violent and 
bloodiest election in its history. The 
oppositional forces largely boycotted the 
vote. Despite the tight security measures, 
with some 50.000 troops deployed in the 
whole country, on many polling stations the 
situation got out of control and more than 
600 were attacked and 100 of them were 
destroyed. Additionally, around 20 people 
died during the election day. This marks a 
dramatic peak in a period of violence which 
early last year which left thousands of 
people injured and claimed hundreds of 
lives. The consequences for the country’s 
economy and the trust among the general 
public with the political and administrative 
system of the country are disastrous. 
Furthermore, this truncated electoral 
process will further deepen the divide in 
Bangladesh’s already extraordinarily 
polarized society, paralyzing the state and 
its institutions. This is a recurring trend 
which has hampered the consolidation of 
democracy since the country came into 
existence.  
This phenomenon is the result of two 
traumatic events: The first one was the 
partition of British India in 1947 as a 
consequence of the transfer of power from 
the colonial ruler to the newly created states 
of India and Pakistan, the latter of which 
was geographically separated into a 
Western and an Eastern part. The second 
one was the War of Liberation in 1971, in 
which East-Pakistan successfully fought 
against the Western wing for succession, in 
which Bangladesh suffered a genocide in 
which 3 million Bangladeshis were killed by 
West Pakistani soldiers and their Islamic 
fundamentalist collaborators in the former 
East Pakistan (Bangladesh). Soon after 
independence, Bangladesh underwent a 
variety of regime changes, from a multi-
party democracy to a one-party system 
(BAKSAL/Bangladesh Krishak Sramik 
Awami League). The growing 
authoritarianism evolved into a praetorian 
(military dominated) polity with periods of 
direct and indirect military rule and then 
reverted several times to a democratic form 
of government. This persistent regime 
changes are the major cause and 
consequence of Bangladesh’s political 
instability. 
One can identify several determinants for 
Bangladesh’s turbulent politics. To begin 
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 with, there is the existence of societal 
cleavages which are (mainly) responsible for 
a high degree of factionalism and the 
intensive politicisation in state and society. 
Basically one can differentiate between two 
clusters of cleavages. First, there are 
cleavages related with the war of 
independence, like confrontation between 
freedom fighters and returnees, 
collaboration with West-Pakistan during the 
armed conflict, and war crimes including the 
issue of impunity. Second, severe 
discrepancies appeared regarding 
fundamental principles of the socio-
economic and political structure of 
independent Bangladesh, especially 
regarding future relations with Pakistan and 
India, role of Islam in politics (secularism), 
relations to Moscow and/or Beijing (leftist 
cleavage), and the type of economic model 
Bangladesh should choose. 
 
In consequence, since its independence 
Bangladeshi politics have been 
characterised as an unrestricted zero-sum-
game over political power. Further features 
of the political arena were extraordinary 
hostility, politics of revenge among the 
country’s elites, which is strictly polarised 
between two camps, represented by the two 
leading political parties AL and BNP.  
 
It is important to note that this conflict 
trickled down into large sections of the 
society and has affected all spheres of 
public life. Hence, many political actors see 
democracy as a destructive tit-for-tat game 
that helps them to achieve selfish, partisan 
objectives which take priority over national 
concerns. Therefore, elections are primarily 
seen as an instrument to outbid the political 
enemy. This is gaining significance, since 
there is also no constructive working 
relationship, not only between the 
government and opposition but also 
between the two leading political parties – 
the AL and BNP. As a result, the parliament 
as a platform for political debate to deal with 
issues concerning the opposition and the 
people (which are already hampered by low 
social capital and education/literacy) is 
paralysed and/or side-lined. Instead, in 
order to ventilate grievances, politics are 
moved to the streets, especially by calling 
hartals (general strikes) with detrimental 
ramifications for the already deteriorating 
socio-economic conditions. Another major 
problem is that the ideological orientations 
of the political leadership are predominantly 
radical in nature which leaves not much 
room for ‘tolerant’ thinking and action 
towards the political opposite. Consequently, 
open and free debate to exchange views, 
and the idea of compromise is rather 
identified as an alien, unfeasible, and 
unthinkable concept. Political controversies 
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 are seen as battles which have to be fought 
out, mostly on the street and in a bloody 
way. One of the dramatic consequences is 
that this dramatically reducing any chance 
for any kind of consensus between AL and 
BNP. 
 
Having this in mind, the current violent 
political turmoil must be seen as a 
continuation of an historical trajectory and 
not just as a spontaneous reaction of a 
single event in the recent development in 
the political arena of Dhaka. Nevertheless, 
there is once again the serious threat that 
this election will leave the country extremely 
difficult to govern. Some commentators are 
even convinced that Bangladesh is 
ungovernable at the moment.  
 
Nevertheless, on 12 January of this year, 
despite all critics, Sheikh Hasina was sworn 
in again as Bangladesh’s Prime Minister as 
well as her 29 Cabinet Ministers. Appeals 
from the international community, foremost 
the US and the UK, to seek for a consensus 
with the oppositional forces and to work 
towards new, free, fair and inclusive 
elections, have simply been brushed aside. 
This is not coming by surprise. It was an 
unfortunate decision by most of the 
significant actors of the international 
community, like the EU, not to send electoral 
observers to Bangladesh. The major 
argument of the international community for 
‘dropping out’, literally that the poll was a 
‘democratic farce’, was short-sighted 
because of two reasons. First, it clearly sent 
out the wrong signal towards the 
oppositional forces. It was obviously in a 
distorted way interpreted by BNP and its 18-
party alliance (including thebanned radical 
Islamic fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami 
party which maintains links with insurgent 
elements) as a moral support by the 
international community of their activities of 
undermining the electoral process and 
confirming that their point of view on the 
irregularity of the election is profound and 
justified. Second, it was alienating the AL 
which was guiding the interim government 
and which now formed the new government. 
In result, the international ‘western’ actors 
which refused to send observers put 
themselves in the backseat regarding talks 
about the possibility of an early re-election, 
at least from the current government 
perspective. In other words, the international 
community was narrowing down its room to 
manoeuvre to negotiate with the Awami 
League. Sheikh Hasina’s persistent 
indifference towards advices regarding a 
solution of the crisis, for example the prior 
idea of a postponement of the elections, 
proposed by the international community 
can be seen as an indication therefore. Of 
cause, foreign diplomats could put some 
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 pressure on Sheikh Hasina on form of the 
threat of cutting off aid or trade benefits. But 
this would most-likely lead to a deterioration 
of the situation instead of creating an 
atmosphere of rapprochement that would be 
necessary to build a consensus.  
 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt about that 
the 2014 general elections in Bangladesh 
were ‘flawed’, as described by the European 
Union, United States and the 
Commonwealth as well as several domestic 
analysts. Most remarkable are the 
expressed concerns about the legitimacy of 
the vote. Basically there are several reasons 
why the last elections must be observed 
with criticism in terms of legitimacy:  
First, there was a tremendous lack of 
contestation and competition, and 
subsequent political choice. Due to the 
boycott of the country’s main oppositional 
forces, the BNP and several other political 
parties in 154 out of 300 constituencies only 
AL candidates stood up for elections. In 
other words, more than half of the 
parliamentary seats are unopposed.  
Second, there were severe hindrances 
towards the active right to vote. The high 
level of violent protests and the sharp 
reaction of the security forces, who did not 
shy away from using their firearms against 
the protestors, have deterred a share of the 
voters from casting their ballots.  
Third, the BEC became the butt of mounting 
criticism. The opposition accused the EC of 
prejudice because its members were 
handpicked by Sheikh Hasina.  
Fourth, the extraordinarily low voter turnout 
of 22 per cent (in 2008 it was 83 per cent) 
hardly matches ‘democratic expectations’, 
which must be seen as a consequence of 
the above mentioned indicators pointing at a 
gap of legitimacy and much disappointment. 
The palpable frustration among registered 
voters reached such a high level that some 
polling centres hardly saw any voters at all. 
In result, the AL won 232 out of the 300 
seats, including those which were not 
contested. 
 
Strictly speaking, from a constitutional point 
of view the elections can be considered 
legitimate. However, when it comes to 
normative democratic practices and 
procedures as well as the common 
understanding of free and fair elections, one 
must conclude that the polls and the 
government that they put in place are 
characterized by a ‘democratic deficit’. 
Because of the above-mentioned four 
reasons, the AL is accused of not having the 
full mandate to represent the general will of 
the people. This determines a challenge 
which will gather significance especially 
when it comes to critical decisions. This will 
be another heavy burden for the 
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 establishment of a minimum working 
relationship between government and 
opposition, which is traditionally either non-
existent or deconstructive. As a result, the 
parliament as place for political debate and 
finding consensus will apparently continue 
its ‘shadow existence’. Instead, the 
opposition will continue with their strategy to 
move the politics out of the parliament into 
the streets to create disorder and to put 
pressure on the government.  
 
Having this in mind, it is almost certain that 
the stalemate and violent protests will 
continue unless both sides can agree on 
some kind of consensus. From the 
perspective of the opposition, such a 
consensus can only consist of mutual 
consent of holding new elections under the 
auspices of a neutral caretaker government 
as soon as possible. But such an agreement 
is not in sight. Instead, it seems that Sheikh 
Hasina is applying a strategy of making fait 
accompli by taking office as Prime Minister 
and installing the government immediately 
after elections. This step can be identified as 
a clear message that the AL leadership is 
not willing to accept a second round of polls, 
which would include the ‘boycotters’. As 
such, the chance to establish a constructive 
working relationship among the major actors 
has been further reduced. Consequently, the 
rift between the AL and BNP will only further 
deepen. The violent conflict is already far 
too entrenched in all spheres of life in 
Bangladesh to deal with it ‘single-handedly’ 
and without the benevolent support of the 
oppositional forces. The potential 
consequence of a situation out of control, 
the proclamation of a state of emergency to 
keep the basic political and administrative 
structure of the country functional would 
only add fuel into the fire. Any such measure 
must function as a déjà vu of authoritarian 
rule which Bangladesh witnessed in its past, 
either in military or civilian form. Already 
Sheikh Hasina’s idea of forming all party 
interim government under the strict AL prefix 
combined with the abolishment of the 
caretaker government, appeared to the 
critics like a re-emergence of Mujibhur 
Rahman’s one-party-system BAKSAL 
(Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami 
League).  
 
Meanwhile, it is obvious that the 
Bangladesh’s armed forces are watching 
from the sidelines. Until now the army 
refrained from intervening in the political 
arena openly, remaining subservient to the 
civilian government. But this situation should 
be not taken for granted and might not last 
forever. The top brass is aware that any 
direct involvement of the military into the 
country’s politics would not be acceptable to 
most of the international community. 
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 Furthermore, the soldiers’ effort two expel 
both during the last military-backed 
caretaker government, Sheikh Hasina and 
Khaleda Zia (also known as minus-two-
formula), did not went down well with most 
Bangladeshis and was sharply rejected. 
Also Sheikh Hasina spent much effort to 
improve her ambiguous ties with the army 
by appeasing them with lucrative 
peacekeeping missions, financial 
concessions, and promises of new military 
equipment and advanced weapons systems 
from China and Russia. But nevertheless, 
taking Bangladesh’s record of army’s 
interventions in the realm of politics into 
account, it would be negligent to rule out a 
priori any possibility of a military action into 
politics. The experience of the above-
described military-backed caretaker 
government shows that there is a ‚concrete 
threat‘, that the military may stage some 
kind of coup to restore order if violent 
confrontations continues or even getting 
worse. 
 
The major question is what will happen 
next? It is apparent that the oppositional 
forces will most likely not accept the result of 
the election and, as already announced, will 
continue its protest. Apart from engaging in 
violent protests which are met with violent 
suppression, it seems that neither the 
opposition nor the ruling party have any 
political will to work towards a compromise. 
However, much depends now on the future 
attitude and actions of Sheikh Hasina and 
her government. At the moment, it appears 
that Sheikh Hasina is willing to implement 
the result of the last elections by all means. 
If she continues to reject early re-elections 
and if she might be forced to suppress 
ongoing violent turmoil in order to keep the 
system functioning (like through proclaiming 
emergency or enacting special power acts), 
things might get out of hand. In order to 
avoid such a worst case scenario, she must 
allow the BNP and other oppositional forces 
the space to express their point of view in a 
peaceful manner that is in accordance with 
constitutional and democratic principles. But 
to be able to return to the country’s 
mainstream politics in a credible way, the 
BNP must fulfil two minimum conditions. 
First, it is important that the BNP distances 
itself from violence and militancy. Second, it 
has to cut its links with the Islamist 
fundamentalist Jamaat and their affiliated 
terrorist network. There is no question that 
the BNP is in a deep identity crisis which 
can easily turn into an existential crisis. Her 
traditional relationship with the army is in 
flux. Additionally, it is obvious that there is 
an increasing influence and infiltration of 
Islamist elements within the BNP to such a 
degree that several analysts have stated 
that the party is at risk of being taken over 
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 by the Islamists. The BNP leadership has to 
finally understand that their support for 
Islamist fundamentalists and the 
undermining of secular principles is not well-
perceived among the masses of the 
Bangladeshi people. The overwhelming 
majority of the Bangladeshis are deeply 
convinced of the notion of secular 
democracy and are identifying Islamic 
fundamentalism as the major threat for 
Bangladesh today. The widespread 
indignation over the destructions of houses 
of Hindus during violence surrounding the 
elections is one of many examples that 
Bangladeshis are rejecting Islamist 
activities. Therefore, the BNP failed to 
establish itself as a popular movement. 
Besides this, a BNP acceptance of the latest 
election results would mean that it will 
accept another five-year term out of power 
and no access to the much needed state 
resources. Without being in power – i.e. 
having the opportunity to offer concrete 
material incentives or privileges – it will be 
difficult for Begum Khaleda Zia to keep the 
ranks closed within the BNP.  
 
To summarize, in order to gain more 
legitimacy and stabilise the situation, Sheikh 
Hasina would be well-advised to call for 
early re-elections. But this would mean that 
she will risk losing the opportunity of further 
weaken the political opponent by keeping 
them out of power and away from state 
resources. This line of argumentation also 
includes the potential loss of resources to 
strengthen its own position based on patron-
client relationships, a main feature of 
Bangladesh politics. Still, should Sheikh 
Hasina be willing to stand up for a second, 
inclusive round of elections she cannot wait 
too long otherwise the AL will lose the 
positive momentum. In other words, it would 
not be interpreted as a concession towards 
the opposition but as a last resort to avoid 
an escalation of the already precarious 
domestic security situation.  
 
However, the heart of the matter remains. 
Even if there will be a next round of 
elections was held that was generally 
perceived as inclusive, free and fair, would 
this mark the end of the political deadlock 
and violence? This question leaves enough 
room for serious doubt. It will be highly 
unlikely that followers of the AL will accept a 
defeat in a potential second round of 
elections. On the other side, it would also be 
naïve to think that the violence of the BNP 
and the Islamists would stop, especially if 
this self-declared ‘democratic movement’ 
consisting of the BNP and her allies does 
not get voted into power. Rather, it appears 
a realistic scenario that this ‘unholy alliance’ 
of BNP and Jamaat will continue their anti-
systemic activities. For the militant 
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extremists of the Islamic fundamentalist 
Jamaat and their associates, elections are 
only interpreted as a way to gain power and 
to get access to resources. But democracy, 
secularism and tolerance as basic 
foundations of Bangladesh and the 
premises of any form of national consensus 
are not in the interests of Islamic 
fundamentalists. In result, meaningful 
elections are only possible when a 
constructive working relationship between 
Sheikh Hasina/AL and Khaleda Zia/BNP is 
achieved, and Islamic fundamentalism is 
getting seriously eradicated.  
